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* Summa
*S Part 2, Ques 20, Article 5
[I-II, Q. 20, Art. 5]
Whether the Consequences of the External Action Increase Its Goodness or Malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually in its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue "makes that which has it to be good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
Obj. 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: "My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown." Therefore the consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice.
Obj. 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (Deut. 25:2): "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." But the punishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is written (Ex. 21:29): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." But he would not have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
Obj. 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.
_On the contrary,_ The consequences do not make an action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or malice.
_I answer that,_ The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.
Reply Obj. 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such is his intention.
Reply Obj. 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
Reply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament. ________________________
SIXTH
*H I beg of Evodia and I beseech Syntyche to be of one mind in the Lord.
Ver. 2. I beg of. S. Chrys. Theod. and many others, think that these were two ladies particularly famous in the Church at Philippi, for their virtue and good works. Some critics are of opinion that Syntyche was a man. It is certain, at least, that this name agrees amongst the Greeks better with a man than a woman; and perhaps the latter of these two may be the husband of Evodia.
*H And I entreat thee also, my sincere companion, help those women who have laboured with me in the gospel, with Clement and the rest of my fellow labourers, whose names are in the book of life.
Ver. 3. I entreat thee, my sincere [1] companion. S. Chrys. expounds it of his fellow labourer or fellow soldier, and says that some pretended that by it was meant S. Paul's wife; but this he absolutely rejects, as do all the ancient interpreters, who teach us that S. Paul was never married, if we except the particular opinion of Clement of Alexandria, (l. 3. strom. p. 448. Edit. Heinsii) who at the same time tells us, that S. Paul and those ministers of the gospel who had wives, lived with them as if they had been their sisters. The pretended reformers, who bring this place to shew that bishops and priests may marry, will they be for living after this manner? See 1 Cor. vii. 7, 8. But even Calvin, Beza, and Dr. Hammond, expound this of some man that laboured with S. Paul. Wi. — It seems probable that S. Paul is here speaking to one of the persons mentioned in the preceding verse. Others think that he is speaking to the gaoler whom he had converted at Philippi. It seems most probable, however, that S. Paul is here speaking to the bishop of the Church, at Philippi. As to the opinion that he is speaking to his wife, we have elsewhere refuted that sentiment. Calmet. — S. Paul says of himself that he had no wife, (1 Cor. vii. 8.) and all the Greek Fathers are very positive on this point. — With Clement. S. Jerom, Estius, and some others, believe that this Clement was the fourth pope that governed the Church, after SS. Linus and Cletus: this at least is the common opinion. — Those women who have laboured with me in the gospel, not by preaching, but by assisting other ways to promote the gospel. Wi.
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 28, Article 2
[II-II, Q. 28, Art. 2]
Whether the Spiritual Joy, Which Results from Charity, Is Compatible with an Admixture of Sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, 6: "Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep." Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), "penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
Obj. 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sorrow.
_On the contrary,_ The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), a twofold joy in God arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always."
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
Reply Obj. 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Isa. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating in the Divine good.
Reply Obj. 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of the Divine good. _______________________
THIRD
*S Part 3, Ques 28, Article 4
[II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]
Whether Joy Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: "Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and A. 2).
Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz. _difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit not its first act. _______________________
*S Part 3, Ques 44, Article 3
[II-II, Q. 44, Art. 3]
Whether Two Precepts of Charity Suffice?
Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26), it seems that there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
Obj. 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
Obj. 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), is a kind of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of charity (Q. 25, A. 4). Now since good is the object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him." And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 3), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were given about each act--about joy (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"--about peace (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men"--about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men"--and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.
Reply Obj. 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): "Be not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against scandal (Rom. 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way." _______________________
FOURTH
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 120, Article 2
[II-II, Q. 120, Art. 2]
Whether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice?
Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now _epikeia_ seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. "above," and _dikaion_, i.e. "just." Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all men," the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "_epikeia_ is a kind of justice."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident.
Accordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher rule of human actions.
Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then _epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "_epikeia_ is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation. _______________________
*S Part 3, Ques 143, Article 1
[II-II, Q. 143, Art.]
Whether the Parts of Temperance Are Rightly Assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
Obj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*_Per-se-sufficientiam_ which could be rendered "self-sufficiency," but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See Q. 169, A. 1.] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance, _shamefacedness,_ whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and _honesty,_ whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is _abstinence,_ and as regards drink properly there is _sobriety._ Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is _chastity,_ and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have _purity._
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by _continence,_ the effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by _humility._ The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by _meekness_ or _mildness._
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of _modesty,_ which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to _method._ The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to _refinement._ The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called _gravity._
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns _lowliness,_ and Andronicus _contentment_; secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes _moderation,_ Andronicus _simplicity._
Reply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165, A. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
Reply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.
Reply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility. _______________________
*S Part 3, Ques 160, Article 2
[II-II, Q. 160, Art. 2]
Whether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions.
Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the "mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by _humility._ The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by _studiousness_ which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.
To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions "meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned _eutrapelia_ to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs.
Reply Obj. 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear. _______________________
*H Be nothing solicitous: but in every thing, by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your petitions be made known to God.
Ver. 6. But in every [2] thing by prayer, &c. By the Greek, the sense and construction cannot be in every prayer; but in every thing, in all circumstances, have recourse to prayer. Wi.
*H For the rest, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely, whatsoever of good fame, if there be any virtue, if any praise of discipline: think on these things.
Ver. 8. For the rest, brethren, whatsoever things are true, &c. Here the apostle enumerates general precepts of morality, which they ought to practise. — Whatsoever things are true. In words, in promises, in lawful oaths, &c. he commands rectitude of mind and sincerity of heart. — Whatsoever things are modest. By these words he prescribes gravity in manners, modesty in dress, and decency in conversation. — Whatsoever things are just. That is, in dealing with others, in buying or selling, in trade or business, to be fair and honest. — Whatsoever things are holy. By these words may be understood, that those who are in a religious state professed, or in holy orders, should lead a life of sanctity and chastity, according to the vows they make; but these words being also applied to those in the world, indicate the virtuous life they are bound by the divine commandments to follow. — Whatsoever things are amiable. That is to practise those good offices in society that procure us the esteem and good will of our neighbours. — Whatsoever things are of good repute. That is, that by our conduct and behaviour we should edify our neighbours, and give them good example by our actions. — If there be any virtue, if there be any praise of discipline: that those in error, by seeing the morality and good discipline of the true religion, may be converted. And finally, the apostle commands not only the Philippians, but all Christians, to think on these things: that is, to make it their study and concern, that the peace of God might be with them. Ch.
*H Now I rejoice in the Lord exceedingly that now at length your thought for me hath flourished again, as you did also think; but you were busied.
Ver. 10. Hath flourished again. Lit. that you have flourished again, to think or care for me, which appears by your sending me a supply of money. Wi. — From hence it would appear, that the Philippians had in some respect been wanting in attention to this apostle: that their former liberality, which for a time had been slack and dead, had again revived.
*H I speak not as it were for want. For I have learned, in whatsoever state I am, to be content therewith.
Ver. 11. I have learned . . . to be content therewith. Lit. to be sufficient. I know how to be in a low condition. Wi.
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 184, Article 7
[II-II, Q. 184, Art. 7]
Whether the Religious State Is More Perfect Than That of Prelates?
Objection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go" and "sell" all [Vulg.: 'what'] "thou hast, and give to the poor"; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do so; for it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): "Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally." Therefore religious are in a more perfect state than bishops.
Obj. 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love of God than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from "service and homage to God," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi); [*Quoted above A. 5] whereas the bishop's state would seem to be ordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the "warden," and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than that of bishops.
Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the contemplative life, which is more excellent than the active life to which the episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that "Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against being sent to preach." Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than the episcopal state.
_On the contrary,_ It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back [*Cf. Luke 9:62]. Yet a man may pass from the religious to the episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that "the holy ordination makes a monk to be a bishop." Therefore the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious.
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), "the agent is ever more excellent than the patient." Now in the genus of perfection according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in the position of "perfecters," whereas religious are in the position of being "perfected"; the former of which pertains to action, and the latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection is more excellent in bishops than in religious.
Reply Obj. 1: Renunciation of one's possessions may be considered in two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a means, to perfection, as stated above (A. 3). Hence nothing hinders the state of perfection from being without renunciation of one's possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices. Secondly, it may be considered in relation to one's preparedness, in the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): "Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in bearing want patiently." Wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): "I know . . . both to abound and to suffer need." Now bishops especially are bound to despise all things for the honor of God and the spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering "with joy the being stripped of" their "own goods" [*Heb. 10:34].
Reply Obj. 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the love of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love of God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him, and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory says (Pastor. i, 5): "If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who refuses to feed God's flock, though having the means to do so, is convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor." And it is a sign of greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend's sake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend.
Reply Obj. 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), "a prelate should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in contemplation," because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not only for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others. Hence Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, "They shall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness," to perfect men returning after their contemplation. _______________________
EIGHTH
*H Nevertheless, you have done well in communicating to my tribulation.
Ver. 14. In communicating; [3] i.e. contributing to relieve my wants. Wi.
*H And you also know, O Philippians, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no church communicated with me as concerning giving and receiving, but you only.
Ver. 15. Giving and receiving; by my giving you spiritual instructions, and you returning me temporal assistance; and know that these, your charities, are an odour of sweetness, an acceptable sacrifice to God. v. 18. Wi.
* Footnotes
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Romans
12:1
I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God, your reasonable service.
*H And may my God supply all your want, according to his riches in glory in Christ Jesus.
Ver. 19. May God supply all your want. [4] See the Greek, which determines the signification of the Latin. Wi.