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- A.M. 3837, A.C. 167.
*H But not long after the king sent a certain old man of Antioch, to compel the Jews to depart from the laws of their fathers and of God:
Ver. 1. After, A. 3837. — Old, or senator. Gr. "Atheneus," or "an Athenian senator."
*H And to defile the temple that was in Jerusalem, and to call it the temple of Jupiter Olympius: and that in Garazim of Jupiter Hospitalis, according as they were that inhabited the place.
Ver. 2. Olympius. They thought this idol agreed best with the idea of the God of heaven, changing the names of the deities, where they had dominion. Other nations made no resistance: but the Jews knew better. C. — Garizim; viz. the temple of the Samaritans. And as they were originally strangers, the name of Hospitalis (which signifies of or belonging to strangers) was applicable to the idol set up in their temple. Ch. — The Samaritans in time of danger, denied that they had any thing to do with the Jews, pretending to be of Sidonian extraction. They even requested that their temple might be dedicated to the Greek Jupiter. Jos. Ant. xii. 7. — Yet Epiphanes chose "the Hospitaller." C. — Sannaballat procured this temple to be erected in the days of Alexander; and Ananias built another in Egypt, under Philometor. Both were schismatical. Jos. Ant. xi. 8. and xv. 6. W.
*H For the temple was full of the riot and revellings of the Gentiles: and of men lying with lewd women. And women thrust themselves of their accord into the holy places, and brought in things that were not lawful.
Ver. 4. Lewd. Priests on duty were not even allowed to approach to their wives, and the most pure women had no right to go into the interior of the temple. C. — And. Gr. "in the courts, and also bringing in improper things." H.
*H And neither were the sabbaths kept, nor the solemn days of the fathers observed, neither did any man plainly profess himself to be a Jew.
Ver. 6. Jew. None did this except he were legally questioned. It would have unnecessarily brought on a persecution. H. — The very name was become criminal, as that of Christian was afterwards. C.
*H But they were led by bitter constraint on the king's birthday to the sacrifices: and when the feast of Bacchus was kept, they were compelled to go about crowned with ivy in honour of Bacchus.
Ver. 7. Sacrifices. Gr. "each month, to the sacrifice (and feast) of entrails," (H.) which were given back to him who presented the victim. Grot. — The eastern kings celebrated their birth-days; Epiphanes did it every month. 1 B. i. 61. Mat. xiv. 6. — About. Gr. "to follow the march;" πομπευειν. Χ. emdash ~ Prot. "to go in procession to Bacchus, carrying ivy." Ward (Err. p. 114) reads πομπαδυειν, and refers the reader to the lexicon to see if there be any thing in it like the Catholic processions, or whether it signify so much as "to go about," as other Prot. Bibles translate it. These interpreters frequently use Catholic terms, where they might render them odious. Id. H.
*H And there went out a decree into the neighbouring cities of the Gentiles, by the suggestion of the Ptolemeans, that they also should act in like manner against the Jews, to oblige them to sacrifice:
Ver. 8. Ptolemeans, who resided at Ptolemais. C. — Most Gr. copies have Ptolemee. C. iv. 45. H. — We find that many of the neighbouring nations invaded the Jews, but were repressed by Judas. 1 B. v. 15.
*H For two women were accused to have circumcised their children: whom, when they had openly led about through the city, with the infants hanging at their breasts, they threw down headlong from the walls.
Ver. 10. Women. See 1 Mac. i. 64. &c. C. — Besides the former massacres, (C. v.) four great martyrdoms are here recorded: first, of two women, with their children; second, of others keeping the sabbath; third, of Eleazar, ninety years old; and fourthly, of the seven brethren, with their mother. C. vii. W.
*H And others that had met together in caves that were near, and were keeping the sabbath day privately, being discovered by Philip, were burnt with fire, because they made a conscience to help themselves with their hands, by reason of the religious observance of the day.
Ver. 11. Philip, the governor of Jerusalem. Ch. — C. v. 22. H. — See 1 B. ii. 31. C.
*H Now I beseech those that shall read this book, that they be not shocked at these calamities, but that they consider the things that happened, not as being for the destruction, but for the correction of our nation.
Ver. 12. Now. A necessary caution for the weak in times of persecution. W. — See C. vii. 32. Judith viii. 22. and 1 B. ii. 52.
*H For it is a token of great goodness, when sinners are not suffered to go on in their ways for a long time, but are presently punished.
Ver. 13. Punished, lest they should become incorrigible. When God neglects to do this, his anger is most terrible. Ezec. xvi. 42. C.
*H For, not as with other nations, (whom the Lord patiently expecteth, that when the day of judgment shall come, he may punish them in the fulness of their sins:)
Ver. 14. Sins. God seems at present to take no notice of the crimes of the Gentiles, or he exterminates them at once, as he did the Chanaanites, Sodom, &c. But the Jews he corrects for their amendment and trial. The sages of paganism never inculcated such excellent maxims.
*H Eleazar one of the chief of the scribes, a man advanced in years, and of a comely countenance, was pressed to open his mouth to eat swine's flesh.
Ver. 18. Scribes; a priest. S. Amb. — He suffered at Antioch, before the king. C. vii. 1. Joseph. l. 2. — The Fathers highly extol his fortitude and virtue, styling him the father of the seven brothers, and the protomartyr of the old law. C. — Yet we find others unnamed suffering before him. v. 10. H. — Eleazar was learned in the Scriptures, and in all divine and human knowledge. W.
*H But he, choosing rather a most glorious death than a hateful life, went forward voluntarily to the torment.
Ver. 19. Hateful. Gr. "criminal life, and went first of his own accord to be bastinaded;" τυμπανιζεσθαι. H. emdash ~ S. Paul probably alluded to this torment, Heb. xi. 35. It was used among the Jews. C. Diss.
*H And considering in what manner he was to come to it, patiently bearing, he determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life.
Ver. 20. Life. He would not eat swine's flesh to save it. Gr. "But spitting it out, (as those ought to come forward who expect to be tortured; or avenged. αμυνεσθαι ) of which things it is not lawful to taste through love of life." H.
* Summa
*S Part 1, Ques 23, Article 2
[I, Q. 23, Art. 2]
Whether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.
Obj. 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (Rom. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.
Obj. 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.
Obj. 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.
_I answer that,_ Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Q. 22, A. 1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
Reply Obj. 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion--for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them.
Reply Obj. 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.
Reply Obj. 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
Reply Obj. 4: Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal. _______________________
THIRD
*H But they that stood by, being moved with wicked pity, for the old friendship they had with the man, taking him aside, desired that flesh might be brought which it was lawful for him to eat, that he might make as if he had eaten, as the king had commanded, of the flesh of the sacrifice:
Ver. 21. Wicked pity. Their pity was wicked, in as much as it suggested that wicked proposal of saving his life by dissimulation. Ch. — To feign or make outward shew of consenting to a false religion, is never lawful. W. — Gr. "They were set over that wicked feast or sacrifice," σπλαγχνισμω, (H.) in which the entrails were eaten. C. — In this sense the term is used v. 7 and 8 by the Vulg. Here Pity is preferred, as the man seemed to be actuated by it. H. — This generous martyr would not scandalize the weak, by doing a thing in itself lawful, which would have been deemed a prevarication. He was guided by those excellent maxims which Christ, S. Paul, and S. Saba (Mart. Ap. xii.) have inculcated and practised. Mat. xviii. 7. Rom. xiv. 14. and 1 Cor. viii. 4. 10. C.
*H But he began to consider the dignity of his age, and his ancient years, and the inbred honour of his grey head, and his good life and conversation from a child; and he answered without delay, according to the ordinances of the holy law made by God, saying, that he would rather be sent into the other world.
Ver. 23. The other. Lit. "hell," or the grave. H. — Under the old law the saints could not enter heaven, but at their departure were detained in limbo. W. — Some holy doctors have declared that they would rather go to hell than commit a sin. S. Ans. — They understand by hell the torments of that place, but not the opposition to God's will, which is found in the damned, and constitutes one of the greatest of their pains. H.
*H For it doth not become our age, said he, to dissemble: whereby many young persons might think that Eleazar, at the age of fourscore and ten years, was gone over to the life of the heathens:
Ver. 24. Age. "Old age ought to be the haven, not the shipwreck, of a former life." S. Amb. de Jacob. W.
*H For though, for the present time, I should be delivered from the punishments of men, yet should I not escape the hand of the Almighty neither alive nor dead.
Ver. 26. Dead. Nothing could be more express for the torments after death. As the time of the Messias drew near, these truths were more developed. C. vii. 9. Wisd. v. 16. Ps. i. 6. C. Grot. Mat. xii. 32.
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 145, Article 4
[II-II, Q. 145, Art. 4]
Whether Honesty Should Be Reckoned a Part of Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . . makes all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable (_honesta_) death, for the most venerable and most holy laws."
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.
Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance.
Reply Obj. 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf. Q. 148, A. 6].
Reply Obj. 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely. _______________________
*H But when be was now ready to die with the stripes, he groaned: and said: O Lord, who hast the holy knowledge, thou knowest manifestly that whereas I might be delivered from death, I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things, because I fear thee.
Ver. 30. Pains. Some of the martyrs seem not to have felt their torments. God made them suffer no more than they could bear. H.
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 123, Article 8
[II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8]
Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For "delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x, 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are called "fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.
Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the brave man seems to have no delight in his act."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee."
Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were walking on roses.
Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad."
Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.
Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."
Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of great bodily pain. _______________________
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