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*Lapide
. Then drew near under Him all the publicans and sinners . πάντες , all, that is, many came together to hear Christ, attracted by His sanctity and by the loving-kindness with which He called sinners to Himself, and promised pardon and salvation to the penitent. For His preaching was, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." S. Mat 4:17 .*Lapide
. And the Pharisees and Scribes murmured. For as they avoided the touch of unclean bodies, so did they avoid that of sinful souls. Hence they did not deign to speak to sinners, much less to eat with them. This constituted the proud spirit of the Pharisees, who thought themselves pure and holy in all things pertaining to the law, and therefore kept apart from the impure that they might not be defiled. To them the spirit of Christ was clearly opposed; for He came into the world to save sinners, and therefore sought opportunity to converse with them, and when invited was present at their feasts; for nothing is more pleasing to God than the conversion of the sinner. "From which we may gather," says S. Gregory ( Hom. 34), "that true justice, i.e . the justice of Christ, is full of compassion, but that the false justice of the Pharisees is scornful." "Indeed, it is," says S. Chrysostom, "the mark of the apostolic life, to think for the salvation of souls."* Footnotes
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*
Matthew
18:12
What think you? If a man have an hundred sheep, and one of them should go astray: doth he not leave the ninety-nine in the mountains, and goeth to seek that which is gone astray?
*H What man of you that hath an hundred sheep, and if he shall lose one of them, doth he not leave the ninety-nine in the desert and go after that which was lost, until he find it?
Ver. 4. What man, &c. Christ left the ninety-nine in the desert, when he descended from the angelic choirs, in order to seek last man on the earth, that he might fill up the number of the sheepfold of heaven, from which his sins had excluded him. S. Amb. — Neither did his affection for the last sheep make him behave cruelly to the rest; for he left them in safety, under the protection of his omnipotent hand. S. Cyril de D. Thoma Aquin.
*Lapide
. What man of you, having an hundred sheep, if he 1ose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it? For a sheep is a simple and foolish animal, which, in search of pasture, easily loses its way and wanders from the fold, and when once astray is unable to return. So that there is need of a shepherd to go forth and seek it. So we, by reason of our sinful lusts, were as wandering sheep, treading the path which led to perdition, without a thought of God or of heaven, or of the salvation of our souls. Wherefore Christ came down from heaven to seek us, and to lead us back from the way of destruction to that which leadeth to eternal life. So we read, "All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all," Isa 53:6 ; and again, "Ye were as sheep going astray; but are now returned unto the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls." 1Pe 2:25 .*Lapide
. And when he hath found it, he layeth it on his shoulders, rejoicing. Or as the Arabic renders it, "He carries it on his shoulders joyfully," that he may the more quickly return it to the flock. In like manner on Christ "was laid," as saith the prophet Isaiah, the iniquity of us all." Hence Gregory of Nyssa, writes in the Catena , "When the shepherd had found the sheep, he did not punish it, he did not drive it to the fold, but placing it on his shoulder, and carrying it gently, he reunited it with the flock." Oh how wondrous is the meekness, clemency, and love of Christ our Lord! It was to represent this love to the faithful that Christ is depicted in our temples with the lost sheep on His shoulders, carrying it back to the flock, and it is related of the son of Charlemagne, that laying aside his royal state, he became a monk, and when employed in keeping sheep, followed to the letter the example set by the Good Shepherd: for humility and the imitation of Christ is in truth the glory of Christian kings.*Lapide
. Rejoice with me; for I have found my sheep which was lost . Συγχάζητέ μοι , Let My joy be one with yours partake of My joy. His joy is so great that he cannot confine it to Himself, His friends must rejoice also. He further indicates that the event is such a happy one, that it ought to afford matter for rejoicing to all. He says not, "Rejoice with the sheep that is found," but, "with Me." Because truly our life is His joy. S. Gregory.*H I say to you that even so there shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance.
Ver. 7. Joy in heaven, &c. What incitement ought it not to be to us to practise virtue, when we reflect that our conversion causes joy to the troops of blessed spirits, whose protection we should always seek, and whose presence we should always revere. S. Amb. — There is greater joy for the conversion of a sinner, than for the perseverance of the just; but it frequently happens, that these being free from the chain of sin, remain indeed in the path of justice, but press not on eagerly to their heavenly country; whilst such as have been sinners, are stung with grief at the remembrance of their former transgressions, and calling to mind how they have forsaken their God, endeavour by present fervour to compensate for their past misconduct. But it must be remembered that there are many just, whose lives cause such joy to the heavenly court, that all the penitential exercises of sinners cannot be preferred before them. S. Gregory, hom. xxxiv.
*Lapide
. I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven , c., i.e. greater joy, for such is implied by the comparative particle ρ̀ , "than." The angels then, and the saints in heaven rejoice with exceeding great joy when it is made known to them, by the revelation of God, that a sinner is converted; for when such an one by repentance passes from condemnation to life, it is a gain to the sinner to the angels and above all to God Himself. The sinner passes from sin unto righteousness, from hell to heaven. The angels therefore rejoice at the blessedness of such an one, because, says Euthymius, they are kindly disposed towards men and because by repentance men become like them in purity and in holiness. They rejoice also on their own account because the ruin which was effected by Lucifer and his angels is remedied by the justification and sanctification of men, and because the places from which these angels fell are restored and filled up. It is a joy to God because He is φιλόψυχος , a lover of souls, and thirsts for the salvation of men. Again the angels rejoice that the desire of God, whom they love above all things, is fulfilled, and that He is a partaker of this joy, as well as honoured by the penitence of the, sinner. Apposite to this matter is the vision of Carpus, to whom Christ made known that He so longed for the conversion of sinners, as to be ready again to suffer death upon the Cross, if thereby this object could be effected. And Palladius relates that a certain Anchorite, who had fallen into sin, repented in sackcloth and ashes with many tears; whereupon an angel appeared to him and said, "The Lord hath accepted thy penitence, and hath had compassion on thee. Take heed that thou art not again led astray." By this argument, Christ rebukes the Pharisees for murmuring against Him because He companied with sinners in order to convert them. For the conversion of sinners is a work most pleasing to God and His angels. The Pharisees ought therefore to take part in this work, and to share in the rejoicing. For "all the fruit" of the Incarnation, and of the death of Christ upon the Cross is "to take away sin," Isa 27:9 , "to bring in everlasting righteousness," and to extend the kingdom of God. S. Mat 6:10 . The knowledge of this ought to excite in every follower of Christ a zealous love for the souls of men. Hence S. Gregory, when he heard that the English had been converted by the preaching of Augustine, rejoiced in spirit, and wrote; "If there is great joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, what joy, think you, has there been over the conversion of so great a people; for by their repentance and faith they have condemned the sins which they aforetime had committed. Whilst heaven is thus rejoicing, let us repeat the angelic strain, and let us all with one accord exclaim, 'Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, goodwill towards men.'" More than over ninety and nine just persons. God and His holy angels, then, rejoice over one penitent more than over one righteous man, nay, more than over ninety and nine just persons; because from the conversion of the sinner there arises a new joy, which seems more perceptible, and is in reality felt more than that continuous and long-standing joy which attaches itself to the ninety and nine; a joy which, although actually the greater, seems to men to lose its freshness by reason of its long duration. For the novelty of a thing which we long for awakens in us a vast and a new joy, which is felt all the more on account of its novelty, as we find when we receive tidings of victories or conversions; and Christ often speaks after the manner of men, especially in His parables. The saying of S. Bernard, that "The tears of penitents are the wine of the angels," applies here: The joy over the conversion of a sinner, writes Emmanuel Sà, is sensibly greater. Although in other respects, a man undoubtedly rejoices more over ninety-nine sheep than over one, and God joys more over ninety and nine just persons than over one sinner that repenteth. S. Gregory adds that God and His angels rejoice the more, because penitents are wont to be more fervent in their love than those who have not fallen away. And elsewhere he says, "The life of fervent devotion which follows after sins committed is often more pleasing to God than that innocence which grows sluggish in its security." "Just as the leader in battle loves that soldier more who, having turned from flight, bravely pursues the enemy, than he who never turned his back and never did a brave act." "And as again the husbandman loves that land more which, after bearing thorns, yields abundant fruit, than that which never had thorns, and never gave him a plentiful crop." Finally ( Hom . 34), he cites the example of Victorinus who, having fallen into carnal sin, entered a monastery, and there subjected himself to the severest penance, and so merited to be transfused with the light of heaven, and to hear the voice of God, "Thy sin is forgiven thee!" If therefore penance be of such avail in a sinner, how great, infers S. Gregory, must be its power in a just man! For many, he says, are conscious of no evil, yet subject themselves to austerities as extreme as if they were beset by every kind of sin. They eschew all things, even such as are lawful, they gird themselves about with a lofty disdain of earth and earthly things, they consider every pleasure forbidden, they deprive themselves of such good things as are allowed them, things that are seen they despise, they yearn for the things which are invisible, they rejoice in mourning, in all things they humble themselves, and deplore sins of thought, as many mourn over sins actually committed.* Summa
*S Part 1, Ques 20, Article 4
[I, Q. 20, Art. 4]
Whether God Always Loves More the Better Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
Obj. 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
Obj. 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
Obj. 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Luke 15:7). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
Obj. 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
_On the contrary,_ Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.
_I answer that,_ It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown (AA. 2, 3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.
Reply Obj. 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according to Isa. 9:6.
Reply Obj. 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.
Reply Obj. 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.
Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).
Reply Obj. 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."
Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.
Reply Obj. 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad. _______________________
*S Part 1, Ques 113, Article 7
[I, Q. 113, Art. 7]
Whether Angels Grieve for the Ills of Those Whom They Guard?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Isa. 33:7): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.
Obj. 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, Luke 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.
Obj. 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.
_On the contrary,_ Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.
_I answer that,_ Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
Reply Obj. 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related Isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God and the angels.
The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence.
Reply Obj. 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness. _______________________
EIGHTH
*H Or what woman having ten groats, if she lose one groat, doth not light a candle and sweep the house and seek diligently until she find it?
Ver. 8. In the preceding parable, the race of mankind is compared to a lost sheep, to teach us that we are the creatures of the most high God, who made us, and not we ourselves, of whose pasture we are the sheep. Ps. xcix. And in this parable mankind are compared to the drachma, which was lost, to shew us that we have been made to the royal likeness and image even of the omnipotent God; for the drachma is a piece of money, bearing the image of the king. S. Chrysos. in S. Tho. Aquin.
*Lapide
. Either that woman having ten pieces of silver , c. "Sweep," or as the Arabic renders it, "cleanse;" not "overturn," as some read with S. Gregory. The "piece of silver," or drachma, was a coin weighing the eighth part of an ounce. Hence S. Cyril explains, that by the parable of the lost sheep we are to understand, mystically, that we are the creatures of God who made us, and the sheep of His pasture, but that by this second parable we are taught that we were created in the image and likeness of God, just as the coin bears the image of the king. S. Gregory ( Hom. 34), very fully explains the parable, and applies it in the following manner: "He who is signified by the shepherd, is signified also by the woman. For it is God Himself God and the wisdom of God. And because there is an image impressed on the piece, the woman lost the piece of silver when man, who was created after the image of God, by sinning fell away from the likeness of his Creator. The woman lighted a candle, because the wisdom of God appeared in man. For the candle is a light in an earthen vessel, but the light in an earthen vessel is the Godhead in the flesh, and when the candle was lit she overturned (evertit) the house. Because as soon as His divinity shone forth through the flesh, all our consciences were appalled. But the word 'overturn' differs not from the 'cleanse' or 'sweep' of the other MSS. Because the corrupt mind, if it be not first overthrown through fear is not cleansed from its habitual faults. But when the house is overturned the piece of silver is found, for when the conscience of man is disturbed, the likeness of the Creator is restored in him." And again, "Who are the friends and neighbours but those heavenly powers afore mentioned, who are near to the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as they approach Him through the grace of continual vision?" Hence in conclusion he says, "The woman had ten pieces of silver, because there are nine orders of angels, but, that the number of the elect might be filled up, man, the tenth, was created, who even after his sin did not fall utterly away from his Maker, because the eternal Wisdom, shining through the flesh by His miracles, restored him by the light of the earthen vessel." Or, as Theophylact interprets it, "The friends are all the heavenly powers; but the neighbours, the thrones cherubims and seraphims which are most nigh unto God." Lastly, S. Gregory Nyssen, says, "The ten pieces of silver are so many virtues, of which we ought to lack none, for like the commandments they are complete in themselves (decem). The candle is the divine word or perhaps the torch of repentance; the neighbours, reason, desire, anger, and such like affections."*H So I say to you, there shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance.
Ver. 10. Before the angels. By this it is plain that the spirits in heaven have a concern for us below, and a joy at our repentance, and consequently a knowledge of it. Ch.
* Summa
*S Part 1, Ques 62, Article 9
[I, Q. 62, Art. 3]
Whether the Beatified Angels Advance in Beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations"; since "they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude.
Obj. 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is not admissible.
_On the contrary,_ Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.
_I answer that,_ In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 12, A. 4), that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.
Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said above (Q. 12, A. 7; Q. 14, A. 3). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.
Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.
Reply Obj. 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely passively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward.
Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is useful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect.
Reply Obj. 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by their ministrations, according to Luke 15:10: "There is [Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance." Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it. _______________________
*S Part 4, Ques 59, Article 6
[III, Q. 59, Art. 6]
Whether Christ's Judiciary Power Extends to the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's judiciary power does not extend to the angels, because the good and wicked angels alike were judged in the beginning of the world, when some fell through sin while others were confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need of being judged again. Therefore Christ's judiciary power does not extend to the angels.
Obj. 2: Further, the same person cannot be both judge and judged. But the angels will come to judge with Christ, according to Matt. 25:31: "When the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him." Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, the angels are higher than other creatures. If Christ, then, be judge not only of men but likewise of angels, then for the same reason He will be judge of all creatures; which seems to be false, since this belongs to God's providence: hence it is written (Job 34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" Therefore Christ is not the judge of the angels.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:3): "Know you not that we shall judge angels?" But the saints judge only by Christ's authority. Therefore, much more does Christ possess judiciary power over the angels.
_I answer that,_ The angels are subjects of Christ's judiciary power, not only with regard to His Divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but also with regard to His human nature. And this is evident from three considerations. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature to God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: "For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold." Consequently, Christ's soul is more filled with the truth of the Word of God than any angel: for which reason He also enlightens the angels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them. Secondly, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human nature in Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so that, as is said in Phil. 2:10: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth." And therefore Christ has judiciary power even over the good and wicked angels: in token whereof it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that "all the angels stood round about the throne." Thirdly, on account of what they do for men, of whom Christ is the Head in a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb. 1:14): "They are [Vulg.: 'Are they not'] all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (?)." But they are submitted to Christ's judgment, first, as regards the dispensing of those things which are done through them; which dispensing is likewise done by the Man Christ, to whom the angels ministered, as related (Matt. 4:11), and from whom the devils besought that they might be sent into the swine, according to Matt. 8:31. Secondly, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, such as the joy which they have at the salvation of men, according to Luke 15:10: "There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance": and furthermore as to the accidental punishments of the devils wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up in hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence it is written (Mk. 1:24) that the devil cried out: "What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? art Thou come to destroy us?" Thirdly, as to the essential reward of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to the essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is everlasting damnation. But this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world, inasmuch as He is the Word of God.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers judgment as to the essential reward and chief punishment.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "Although the spiritual man judgeth all things, still he is judged by Truth Itself." Consequently, although the angels judge, as being spiritual creatures, still they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is the Truth.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ judges not only the angels, but also the administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii) the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ's soul, which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:5): "For God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come"--subject namely to Christ--"of whom we speak" [Douay: 'whereof we speak'] [*The words "subject namely to Christ" are from a gloss]. Nor does it follow that God set another over the earth; since one and the same Person is God and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ.
Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for the present. _______________________
TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS (QQ. 60-90) _______________________
*H And he said: A certain man had two sons.
Ver. 11. A certain man had two sons. By the elder son is commonly expounded the Jewish people, who for a long time had been chosen to serve God; and by the younger son, the Gentiles, who for so many ages had run blindly on in their idolatry and vices. Wi. — Some understand this of the Jews and Gentiles, others of the just and sinners. The former opinion seems preferable. The elder son, brought up in his father's house, &c. represents the Jews; the younger prodigal is a figure of the Gentiles. Calmet.
*Lapide
. And He said, A Certain man had two sons . This parable is the third of the series, and like the two preceding ones, is designed to show the joy which is in heaven over the conversion of a sinner. And so there are three principal persons in the parable, the father and his two sons, the elder careful of his possessions, the younger a spendthrift. The father is God, who created all men, or Christ, who redeemed and regenerated all men with His blood, and who daily regenerates them by baptism. The two sons are understood by universal consent to represent the Jews and the Gentiles. By the elder, who was ever with his father, we may understand the Jews; by the younger the Gentiles, who having worshipped God in the days of Adam and Noah, turned aside to idols and the sins of the flesh: an interpretation which is borne out by the 25th verse, for it was the Jews who murmured because the Gentiles were received into grace and favour by Christ. But still more in accordance with the purpose of the parable, we may take the two sons to represent the just and the unjust, whether Jews or Gentiles. For the sinners with whom Christ companied, thereby causing the Pharisees to murmur against Him, were clearly Jews and not Gentiles. The elder son represents the just, i.e . those who were really just, as well as those who, like the Scribes and Pharisees, claimed to be such. The younger son, the prodigal, is put for open and notorious sinners, such as the publicans and harlots, with whom Christ was wont to associate in order that He might win them from the error of their way. So S. Jerome and most other interpreters explain the parable.*H And the younger of them said to his father: Father, give me the portion of substance that falleth to me. And he divided unto them his substance.
Ver. 12. It is very probable, from this verse, that the children of the family, when come to age, could demand of their parents the share of property which would fall to their lot. For these parables suppose the ordinary practices of the country, and are founded on what was customarily done. Grotius thinks this was the common law among the Phœnicians. — The Gentiles, prefigured by the prodigal son, received from their father, (the Almighty,) free-will, reason, mind, health, natural knowledge, and the goods which are common to mankind, all which they dissipated and abused. Sinners who have besides received the gift of faith and sanctification, by baptism, and who have profaned the holiness of their state, by crimes, are more express figures of the bad conduct of this son. Calmet.
*Lapide
. And the younger of them said to his father, Father, give me the portion of goods that falleth to me. The younger, i.e. sinners and harlots. For youth is less restrained, more foolish, more inconstant, and more prone to indulgences of every kind. According to the Fathers, the "goods," "substantia," must be taken to mean man's free will, called in Greek βίος . "Because by it," says S. Jerome, "man lives freely and as it pleases him." "For," observes Theophylact, "the substance of man is the capacity of reason which is accompanied by free will." S. Ambrose and others, by substance, understand more fitly the grace of God, virtues and good habits. For it is these which are really wasted and destroyed by the sinner, whilst his free will cannot be lost, as is clear from the parable. You may therefore take the word to mean all the gifts of God, of body and soul, of nature and grace; for these the younger son demands to be entirely given up to him, because he was unwilling any longer to submit to the authority of his father, but desirous of being his own master, and of being free to use or abuse the gifts of God as might seem to him good. So S. Augustine ( Evang. lib. ii . q. 35) writes, "To live, to understand, to remember, to excel in quickness of intellect, these things are gifts of God, which men receive into their own power by freewill." So also S. Jerome, Titus, and Euthymius. And he divided unto them his living. Placing the gifts just mentioned at the free disposal of each, for "He left man in the hand of his counsel." Ecclus. 15:14.*Lapide
. And not many days after the younger son, gathered all together, or, according to the Syriac version, "collected together all that had come to him," and took his journey, into a far country "far off," says Euthymius, "not by local separation, but by separation in point of virtue." Such is a state of concupiscence and sin, for the sinner by sinning goes far from God and from heaven, and subjects himself to the dominion of Satan. "But," says Euthymius, "the elder son being wise, remained with his father." Hence S. Augustine goes on to say, "The far country is forgetfulness of God, a forgetfulness which is mutual, for inasmuch as the sinner forgets God, God in His turn is in a manner forgetful of the sinner, i.e . God ceases to bestow on him light, grace, or guidance." For S. Jerome says, "We must bear in mind that we are with God, or depart from Him, according to our disposition, not according to 'distances of place.'" Therefore, adds Theophylact, "when a man departs from God, and from the fear of God, he wastes and consumes all God's gifts." And there wasted his substance , i.e., all the gifts of nature and grace. For the sinner, giving himself up to pleasure and licentiousness, incurs the loss of all God's gifts of grace. He becomes dull of understanding and is unable to recognise God, or the beauty of holiness. He grows forgetful of God's law and God's goodness towards him. He so corrupts his will as to prefer vice to virtue, pleasure to reason, earth to heaven, the evil one to God; and forsaking the paths of virtue, gives himself up to every kind of evil. Hence he becomes destitute of counsel, reason, sense, and everything that is good; and at last, with all the powers of his soul and body, he worships the creature rather than the Creator, and falls into that sin to which the Psalmist refers, "So they that forsake Thee shall perish; Thou hast destroyed all them that commit fornication against Thee." Ps. lxxiii. 26. The prodigal son "wasted all the graces of nature," says Euthymius, because, adds S. Augustine, "he made a wrong use of his natural gifts." "He then," says Titus, "expended his goods" (substantiam), i.e ., the light which was in him, temperance, the knowledge of the truth, the remembrance of God. And lastly, says Euthymius again, "he corrupted the gift which he had received at his baptism, i.e . nobility of soul, and the capability of living a godly life, for such things as these made up the riches of the prodigal. With riotous living. By living an abandoned life ( α̉σώτως ), only sinful but also luxurious and intemperate. "A prodigal life," says the Gloss, "loves to occupy itself in outward show, forgetful of God, who has His dwelling within."* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 119, Article 1
[II-II, Q. 119, Art. 1]
Whether Prodigality Is Opposite to Covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
Obj. 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we give here the name of covetousness.
_I answer that,_ In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be "covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.
Reply Obj. 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Reply Obj. 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate." _______________________
SECOND
*Lapide
. And when he had spent all . . . he began to be in want. Or, according to the Arabic, "he became destitute," as those who lose by one year's debauchery all that their parents have left them; and after that are reduced to misery and to begging their bread. Nor do they lose their property only, but their health and good name as well, and by reason of the foulness of their habits and the diseases which they contract, become a burden to themselves, and a disgust to their fellowmen. For it is acknowledged by all that luxury and extravagance make the richest poor, and reduce men to the very verge of starvation. Mystically. The sinner suffers from the want of all things, whether of nature or of grace, because he turns the gifts which he possesses to his own destruction, and therefore is in a far worse condition than if he had never received them. And again, the sinner being without God, lacks everything; for all things depend upon Him, and in Him live and have their being. Hence the Interlinear, "Every place whence the Father is absent, is a place of penury and want." For he who has not God possesses nothing, although he be king of the whole world. Again he who has God possesses all things, although he may not have a farthing to call his own. Or, as S. Francis expresses it, "God is mine and all things." For God alone can be said to be; and all things else compared to Him, not to be. See Exod. iii Moreover, the Gloss says, "Pleasure always hungers for itself the more we indulge in it, the more insatiably we thirst after it;" and S. Jerome, "Our health and strength depart from us by reason of our sinful indulgences, yet we do not lose the desire of indulging. "While yet in sport, for other sports we burn, In gardens fair, for other gardens yearn."*Lapide
. And he went and joined himself to a citizen of that country , i.e., to an evil spirit, for the devils are the citizens of the country far off from God. So S. Augustine ( Quæst. Evang. lib. ii . q. 33.) says, "He joined himself to a certain prince of the air belonging to the army of the devil, whose fields signify the manner of his power. The swine are the unclean spirits which are under him, and to feed them is to work those things in which they delight." So also S. Ambrose, "The citizen is the prince of this world," and in like manner the Gloss. S. Peter Chrysologus ( Serm. 2.) says, "Behold the effect of unbridled desires. It turned a citizen into an alien, a son into a hireling, a rich man into a beggar, a free man into a slave. It associated him whom it separated from a kind father with swine; that he who had despised a holy affection might be the slave of the greedy herd." S. Ambrose judges rightly that by the expression "he joined himself to" we are to understand a dangerous as well as a laborious service. For as a bird is snared when seeking food, so the unhappy sinner, hoping for the delights of freedom, falls into a perilous slavery. And he sent him into his field. That is, says Bede, "he became a slave of earthly desires." To feed swine. "To feed swine," says S. Chrysostom in the Catena , "is to nourish in the soul sordid and unclean thoughts. See here how marvellously the condition of the sinner is changed, as a just punishment for the foolish use he made of his freedom. He who was unwilling to be held in honour as a son, is obliged to become the bond slave of an alien. He who would not obey the laws of God, is compelled to serve Satan. He who would not abide in his father's palace, is sent to dwell amongst clowns. He who would not associate with his brethren and with princes, becomes the attendant and companion of swine. He who refused the bread of angels, would fain satisfy his hunger with husks from the hog-trough."*H And he would fain have filled his belly with the husks the swine did eat: and no man gave unto him.
Ver. 16. Husks. This expresses the extreme misery of his condition. There is no need of seeking any other mystery in this word. Horace, by a kind of hyperbole, (B. ii, Ep. 1.) represents the miser as living upon husks to be able to save more.
*Lapide
. And he would fain have filled his belly with the husks that the swine did eat. So those who foolishly squander their possessions on others, find none to give them even husks in their misery and want. S. Chrysostom ( Serm. 1) says, "Hunger, to luxury a torment, is now his lot, that where his guilt had been flagrant there an avenging punishment might rage." And again, "How cruel a service! He lives with unclean animals, yet does not share in their feast. Wretched man that he is; half famished, he hungers for the swine's coarse food, yet does not obtain it. S. Jerome ( Epist. 146) here remarks, "that the Devil, when he has brought a man into subjection, fires his soul with desires of all kinds, but cheats him of their gratification, that by longing after them he may increase his guilt, and by failing to gratify them may add to his punishment and misery." Such is the deceitfulness and the tyranny of Satan. "Husks" are the empty pods of beans, peas, and the like, which fill but do not nourish the body. Yet country folk mix these husks with flour or meal, and make thereof a common kind of black bread on which they live. Hence Horace ( Epist. 1, lib. ii.) writes, "He lives on husks and coarse bread." Jansenius understands by "husks," the fruit of the Carob tree, which is like a bean, of a blackish colour, curved, as long as a man's finger, and as broad as his thumb. Each pod contains four berries called ceratia from their likeness to a horn ( κέζας ;). These afford excellent food for swine, and are also eaten by men. But by "husks" the Fathers understand "that worldly and vain knowledge which begets vanity, such as the writings of the poets, or the harangues of the orators." "Wherein," says S. Augustine, "this man sought to find something belonging to the higher life, but could not." The word, however, may be taken to mean more fully "carnal gratifications which puff out and afflict the soul but do not satisfy its yearnings." So S. Chrysostom in the Catena writes, "If thou lovest good wine, thou lovest husks; if thou longest for gold, thou dost seek for husks; if thou followest after sensual pleasures, thou askest for the food of swine."*Lapide
. And when he came to himself, or, as the Arabic renders it, "when he was considering within himself." Euthymius says, becoming master of himself, and as it were waking up from the deep sleep of the drunken." "Returning from his wanderings abroad." Theophylact. "For," says the Interlinear, "he who has gone away from himself does well to return;" and the prodigal had been in a manner beside himself, and a raving madman, but his misery gave him understanding, and hunger taught him to be wise. So S. Gregory Nyssen. ( Trad de Oratione ) writes, "He did not return to his former state of happiness until, coming to himself, he felt the full weight of his cares." And S. Augustine ( Quæst. Evang. lib. xxi.): "He turned his thoughts (intentionem) from these things, which act externally as snares and temptations, to his inner conscience" "For," says S. Ambrose, "he who returns to it returns to himself, but he who departs from Christ forfeits his rights in Christ." How many hired servants of my father's , c. They have bread enough and to spare, but I, his son, am perishing with hunger. So God is wont to take away from those who live for pleasure all their delights, and send them hunger, sickness, and pain, that they may return to a better mind, and see what happiness they have forfeited, and into what misery they have fallen; which is the first stage of repentance. Hence Titus writes, "Coming to himself, i.e . comparing his former happiness with his after misery, he thought of what he was whilst he abode with his father, and meditated over and over again on the vile and wretched state to which he had reduced himself by his rejection of God, and subjection to Satan." Learn then from the example of the prodigal, that "repentance follows on hasty counsel, and that a bad beginning makes a bad ending;" and again, "that thou be not conquered by a shameful adversary, regard pleasure only when it is departing from thee, for pleasure is the food of the wicked." Mystically. If we serve God and follow virtue in hope of worldly gain, we are hirelings; if from fear, slaves; if from love, sons. As the Interlinear says, "How many Jews are there who keep the law only for the sake of present prosperity, and obtain of God that which they desire; but I, who neglect God's law, prosper neither in my temporal nor my spiritual concerns." S. Augustine, on the other hand, says, "These are the reflections of a man who is coming to a better mind again, and finds himself amongst those who preach the truth, not from love of the truth, but from the desire of earthly gain." But the Gloss takes higher ground: "The hirelings are they who busy themselves in walking worthily, looking for the reward which is to be. These have bread enough and to spare, i.e . they are sustained by the daily nourishment of Divine grace." He then who is restrained from vice by fear of punishment is the slave; by hope and longing for the kingdom of heaven, the hireling; by love of that which is good, the son. And Theophylact, in like manner, makes this threefold distinction amongst those who are saved. The Interlinear again, and others who understand by the two sons the Jews and Gentiles, explain thus: "The Jews, who like hirelings serve God in hope of obtaining the good things of this world, possess them plentifully; but the people of the Gentiles, together with the idolaters, are wholly cut off from the truth."*H I will arise and will go to my father and say to him: Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee.
Ver. 18. How merciful is the Almighty, who, though so much offended, still does not disdain the name of father. — I have sinned. These are the first words of a sinner's confession to the author of nature. God knows all things; still does he expect to hear the voice of your confession. It is in vain to think of concealing your sins from the eyes of him whom nothing can escape; and there can be no danger of acknowledging to him what his infinite knowledge has already embraced. Confess then that Christ may intercede for you, the Church pray for you, the people pour forth their tears for you. Fear not that you cannot obtain pardon, for pardon is promised to you; grace, and a reconciliation with a most tender parent, are held out to you. S. Ambrose. — Before thee, &c. By this does our Redeemer shew, that the Almighty is here to be understood by the name of father: for the all-seeing eye of God only beholds all things, from whom even the secret machinations of the heart cannot be concealed. S. Chrys. ex D. Tho.
*Lapide
. I will arise and go to my father. "I will arise," says the Interlinear, "because I perceive that I have fallen prone before idolatry and vice. I will go to my father, for I have wandered far from him, and am wearing away my life in misery and want. I will rise from this wretched life. I will break away from my vices, cease from sin, amend my life. I will repent, and humbly beg of God the pardon of my sin." "Well does he say, 'I will arise,'" writes S. Jerome ( Epist. 146), "for away from his father he could not stand upright. It is the part of sinners to lie prone, of the just to stand upright." For as Chrysologus ( Serm. 1) says, "As long as a man is with his father, his state is happy, his service free, and his safety assured. He reverences his father with gladness. If corrected it is with gentleness. Though poor he is rich, and his possessions are secure." And again, "he determines to return, because he perceived that with a stranger his liberty was slavery, and because he believed that with his father his slavery would be liberty." And will say unto him. These words, says Titus, are few, but enough for my salvation; for I know my father's loving-kindness, and that he will have compassion on the penitent, whom he did not abandon, even when wallowing in the foulness of sin. Father, I have sinned. "This," says S. Ambrose, "is his first confession to the author of nature, the dispenser of mercy, the judge of his sin. For although God knows all things, He waits to hear the acknowledgment of our sins, because he who takes the burden of his sin upon himself lessens its weight, and he who by confession anticipates the accuser, deprives the accusation of its sting. In vain wilt thou endeavour to hide from Him, whom nothing escapes, and you may safely discover what you know to be already known." God, therefore, justly and fitly demands of the sinner the confession of his sin. 1. Because a criminal ought to humble himself, and confess his crime, if he would be forgiven. 2. Because, according to Origen ( Hom. ii on Ps. xxxviii.), as a disordered stomach must be purged by emetics, so must the soul which is full of corruption be purified by confession. 3. Because the sinner has cast contempt on the majesty of God, and can only make amends for his fault by repentance. For repentance gives glory to God, and restores to Him the honour which sin takes away. In a word, the penitent acknowledges that he himself is a sinner, but that God is most holy. 4. The confession of the sinner therefore is for the praise and glory of God the Creator, as well as of Jesus Christ our Saviour. "For," says S. Cyprian, or the author of the Treatise on the Passion, whoever he way be, "when the sinner takes upon himself the office of judge and tormentor, becoming his own prosecutor, and showing by the shame he exhibits that his confession is genuine, his entire self-sacrifice obtains pardon for him in the sight of God. For God does not pass judgment twice on the same offence." Against heaven That is, (1.) I have sinned so grievously that my sins, as it were, cry to heaven for vengeance, or by a Hebraism, we may understand "against heaven" to mean, against God who dwelleth therein. (See S. Mat 21:25 .) 2. "Against heaven," because in preferring earth to heaven, I have committed a great wrong and have lightly esteemed heavenly things; so that if heaven were endowed with voice and reason, it would cry out and make accusation against me. 3. "Against heaven" because heaven is my home, and I am only a sojourner here on earth. I have therefore betrayed my native land. So S. Gregory Nyssen, ( De Oratione ), says, "He would not have confessed that he had sinned against heaven, unless he had been persuaded that heaven was his country and that he had sinned in leaving it." And S. Jerome, "He sins against heaven who leaves the heavenly Jerusalem." 4. "Against heaven," i.e . "against the angels and those that dwell therein," says the Interlinear, and also S. Augustine 5. Or "against heaven" because according to S. Ambrose, "he had wasted the gifts of heaven." By which we may understand "the endowments of the soul and the spiritual gifts which are impaired by sin and by our departure from the heavenly Jerusalem, which is the mother of us all." Symbolically , S. Chrysostom, in the Catena , says, "He sins against heaven who sins against the humanity of Christ, which although above us as heaven, is yet visible." For the sinner makes of none effect the blood of Christ, and in a manner "crucifies the Son of God afresh." Heb 6:6 . And before Thee. "Who alone," says S. Chrysostom, "seest all things, and to whom the thoughts of all hearts are revealed. Great then is the shamelessness of the sinner in daring to sin before the living God, who will punish him for his offences in the day of judgment, and who not unfrequently inflicts punishment in this life as a warning to others not to offend." S. Jerome here explains that "he had sinned against his father in that, forsaking his Creator, he had bowed down in worship to idols of wood and of stone." Symbolically , S Augustine ( Quæst. Evang. lib. ii . q . 33) interprets the words "before thee" to mean "in the inmost conscience." For the sinner ought to blush even for the sins which he commits in secret, and for the conscience which he defiles, renders dumb, and hands over to Satan.*Lapide
. And am no more worthy to be called thy son. Because, says S. Jerome, I preferred to serve idols, and to be the slave of vices. "He does not presume," says Bede, "to ask to be treated as a son," because, adds Euthymius, "his life had been unworthy of such a father." Make me as one of thy hired servants. I have forfeited my position as son, but cast me not out of thy presence, suffer me to take the lowest place in thy household, says Euthymius, that I may make open confession of my sin. For formerly those who had been put to public penance were not allowed to enter the church, but knelt without, humbly asking the prayers and the pardon of all, as S. Jerome tells us that Fabiola did. These, says S. Augustine ( lib. ii . Quæst. Evang. q. 33), are the words of one who is turning his thoughts to repentance, not of one actually repentant. For he is not addressing his father, but only determining what to say when he meets him. "But," says Primasius, commenting on Rev. iv., "as the smoke precedes the flame, so must there be confession of sin before the fires of faith and love are kindled in the sinner's heart. Hence the smoke bursts into flame as the fire gains power and intensity; so in like manner confession of sin through force of contrition burns up and becomes aflame with love."*Lapide
. But when he was yet a great way off, his father saw him. Before he had given any expression to his penitence, his father prevented him. See here God's wonderful loving-kindness towards penitent sinners. "He is wont," says Titus, "in His mercy and pity to anticipate the repentance of men;" and, adds S. Gregory of Nyssa, "when he resolved to repent, his father was reconciled to him." And had compassion , ε̉σπλαγχνίσθη , was moved with pity at the sight of his misery. And ran. In excess of joy, says Euthymius, he waited not for him to draw nigh, but went to meet him, running and thereby showing the greatness of his love. And fell on his neck, and kissed him . "To fall on his neck," says S. Augustine, "is to lower to his embrace the arm of God, which is Christ; to give the kiss is to comfort by the word of God's grace unto the hope of pardon of sin." But S. Chrysostom says, "The mouth is kissed as that from which the heartfelt confession of the penitent proceeded." The embrace and t e kiss are here set forth as the tokens of pardon and reconciliation, and of especial love and goodwill, as well as of the exultation and joy with which God and His angels regard a sinner that repenteth.*Lapide
. And the son said unto him, Father, I have sinned , c. He desires, says the Interlinear, that to be done by grace, which he acknowledges himself to be unworthy of by any merit of his own. (See above on ver. 18.) He omits to say, "make me as one of thy hired servants," either because his father, out of love and joy, had cut short his confession, by bidding the attendants "bring forth the best robe," or because his father's embrace and kiss had encouraged him to hope that again he might be acknowledged as a son. "He does not add," says S. Augustine ( Lib. ii . Quæst. Evang. q. 33), "what he had before determined to say, for after the kiss of his father he most nobly disdained to become a hireling." Titus, however, is of opinion that the words were actually uttered, although S. Luke, has not recorded them.* Summa
*S Part 4, Ques 85, Article 3
[III, Q. 85, Art. 3]
Whether the Virtue of Penance Is a Species of Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 62, A. 3). But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation." Therefore penance is not a species of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative." But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.
Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Luke 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things." But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in _De Poenitentia_ [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done." But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.
It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to Luke 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord."
Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.
Reply Obj. 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in _Ethic._ v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.
Reply Obj. 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice.
Reply Obj. 4: Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude. _______________________
FOURTH
*H And the father said to his servants: Bring forth quickly the first robe and put it on him: and put a ring on his hand and shoes on his feet.
Ver. 22. The first; i.e. the best robe: by it, is meant the habit of grace. Wi.
*Lapide
. But the father said to his servant , c. "The servants," says Theophylact, "are the angels or the priests," or, according to S. Augustine, the preachers, for by their ministry God reconciles sinners to Himself. The best robe. The "first" robe, that which he was wont to wear before he left his father's house, for from the repetition of the article τὴυ στολὴν τὴν πζώτην, it is clear that some particular garment is indicated. Hence, in the lives of the Fathers, it is related that a certain Bishop saw in a vision two women who were sinners, clothed, after having made sacramental confession, in white garments and radiant with light. He inquired the cause of this from an angel that appeared unto him, and was told that the women, by their confession and tears, had rendered themselves worthy to be numbered with the elect. And put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet. A ring of gold, i.e. the mark of a free and rich or noble man, as also are shoes, for slaves go barefoot, but citizens are shod.* Summa
*S Part 4, Ques 89, Article 1
[III, Q. 89, Art. 1]
Whether the Virtues Are Restored Through Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 6). Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance.
Obj. 2: Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that "God forms the virtues in us without us." Therefore it seems that the virtues are not restored through Penance.
Obj. 3: Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds." Now many penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the virtues are not restored through Penance.
_On the contrary,_ We read (Luke 15:22) that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in "the first robe," which, according to Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the "mantle of wisdom," from which all the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.
_I answer that,_ Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). But there can be no remission of sins except through the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 110, A. 4, ad 1). Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.
Reply Obj. 1: Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it causes grace, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). Now it is a cause of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.
Reply Obj. 2: In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are already there.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 86, A. 5), sometimes after the first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue. Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with pleasure and ease, even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body. _______________________
SECOND
*Lapide
. And bring hither the fatted calf . τον μόσχον , that particular calf which I ordered to be fattened for such a solemn occasion as this. All these things, the robe, the ring, the shoes, and the fatted calf, show the delight of the father, i.e . the joy of God and His angels at the conversion of a sinner, and teach us that by the great mercy of God, a penitent is restored to the same, or even a better position than that, which he held before he fell into sin. But with S. Augustine, S. Jerome, and Bede, we may attach a separate meaning to each. So we may take the best robe to mean not innocence, for this once lost cannot be regained, but first grace and love. Thus the Interlinear interprets it as, "the robe of the Holy Spirit, which is an earnest of immortal life." According to S. Ambrose, it is "the cloke of wisdom;" but S. Augustine considers it "the dignity which Adam lost." By the ring we may understand the express image of God, which some see in one virtue, some in another. "The ring," says Bede, "is the seal of our unfeigned faith," or, according to S. Chrysostom in the Catena , the symbol of the seal of salvation, or rather, the badge of betrothment, the pledge of nuptials with Christ. It is "the signet of faith with which the promises are sealed in the hearts of the faithful." Gloss. "The seal of Christ's image, and impress of the truth." Interlinear. "The pledge of the Holy Spirit, because of the participation of grace, which is well signified by the finger." S. Augustine. See Gen 41:42 ; Jer 22:24 ; Hag 2:23 . "On his hand," i.e . by his working, that his faith may be made manifest by his works, and that his works may be established by his faith. Interlinear. By "the shoes on his feet" is typified promptitude in the exercise of acts of virtue, particularly as regards the preaching of the gospel; for those who are converted greatly desire the conversion of others. Or, as S. Augustine explains, "The shoes are the preparation for preaching the gospel, in order not to touch earthly things," that, says S. Chrysostom, "a man may walk firmly along the slippery path of the world;" the course of our life is called in Scripture a foot (pes). Again, "the shoes" are the examples of good men, which, as it were, leave footprints, to enable us to follow in their steps. "The fatted calf" is a figure of Christ, who in the Eucharist feeds the just, and those sinners who are penitent, with His body and His blood, comforting and soothing in a wonderful manner those who have been newly converted as well as those who have long since repented. Hence the Interlinear says, "Christ is the fatted calf abounding in every spiritual virtue, so that He suffices for the salvation of the whole world." And S. Chrysostom: "Christ is called the calf because of the sacrifice of His body, and fatted, because He made satisfaction for all." And Augustine: "The fatted calf is our Lord Himself in the flesh, 1oaded with insults. The father commands it to be brought, i.e . commands Christ to be preached. He also bids them kill it, in allusion to the death of Christ. For He is then killed to each man who believes him slain." Let us eat and be merry. God, says Euthymius, is said to eat in proof of His joy. "For," adds S. Jerome ( Ep. 146), "there can be no rejoicing if our Father be absent from the feast," because, says Bede and S. Ambrose, "the food of the Father is our salvation; the joy of the Father the redemption of our sins." And according to the Gloss, "The salvation of sinners is the refreshment of God and the saints. Observe also that the calf is slain after that the robe, the ring, and the shoes are provided, to teach us that we must put on the hope of the immortality for which we were created, that we must seal our works with the signet of faith, and preach by the confession of Christ, if we would partake of the heavenly mysteries."*H Because this my son was dead and is come to life again, was lost and is found. And they began to be merry.
Ver. 24. Was dead, and is come to life again. A sinner, in mortal sin, is deprived of the divine grace, which is the spiritual life of the soul. At his conversion it is restored to him, and he begins to live again. Wi.
*Lapide
. For this my son was dead, and is alive again. He was dead by reason of his sins; he is alive again because of his repentance.*H Now his elder son was in the field and when he came and drew nigh to the house, he heard music and dancing.
Ver. 25. His elder son, &c. We have already remarked, that this son represents the Jews. He boasts of having always served his father faithfully, and of never disobeying him. This is the language of that presumptuous people, who believe themselves alone holy; and despising the Gentiles with sovereign contempt, could not bear to see the gates of salvation laid open also to them. The 28th, 29th, and 30th verses express admirably the genius of the Jewish people; particularly his refusing to enter his father's house, shews their obstinacy. Calmet.
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 44, Article 2
[II-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]
Whether There Should Have Been Given Two Precepts of Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to virtue, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (Q. 33, A. 5). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.
Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27), charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our neighbor.
Obj. 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Luke 15:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 91, A. 3; Q. 94, A. 2) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; Q. 26, A. 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.
Reply Obj. 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.
Reply Obj. 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.
Reply Obj. 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice from the same source and from no other.
Reply Obj. 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above. _______________________
THIRD
*Lapide
. And he was angry, and would not go in. The anger and the murmuring of the elder son is the application of the parable, and is intended to show how justly God rejoices over the conversion of a sinner, and what answer can be given to those who murmur at the consideration shown to those that repent. "Hence we learn," says Euthymius, "that God rejoices so greatly over the return of the prodigal, in order that He may provoke others to jealousy." So also Theophylact, Titus, and S. Chrysostom in the Catena ; for it is certain that the righteous do not envy penitent sinners the blessings they enjoy, but rejoice greatly and exalt in their happiness. See S. Mat 20:2 . Hence we are to understand rather by the murmuring of the elder son, the envy of the Pharisees who murmured against Christ because He received sinners. For this was the occasion as well as scope of the parable, as is clear from the opening verses of the chapter. Similarly also the parable applies to the Jews, who hated the Apostles and murmured against them, because they preached the Gospel to the Gentiles. So S. Ambrose says, "The Jews envied the Gentiles the paternal blessing," and S. Augustine ( Quæst. Evang. ii. 33), "He is angry now, and will not go in. But when the fulness of the nations shall have entered in, then the father will go forth that all Israel may be saved." Again S. Ambrose, "He is called the elder because he envied his brother, and envy causes a man very quickly to grow old." He heard music and dancing. That is, as S. Augustine explains, "He heard the Apostles full of the Holy Spirit preaching the Gospel with harmonious voices. He takes one of the prophets to read, and as he searches in it, asks in a manner, why are these feasts celebrated in the Church at which he finds himself not present." But S. Ambrose says, "He heard the harmony of the Christian people singing with united voice, and raising sweet sounding strains of joy over the salvation of the sinner. But he stands without, for his evil disposition hinders him from entering in;" and the Gloss, "The Church's symphony is the accord of different ages and varying virtues, whence the chorus and spiritual dance of holy and exultant joy." Tropologically , S. Jerome ( Epist. 146) says, "Daily is this feast kept, daily does the Father receive His Son, for Christ is ever being crucified for them that believe." See also Salmeron ( Tom. vii . Tract. 27 and 28). Therefore came his father out and intreated him. Symbolically , this signifies that God through the preaching of Christ and His Apostles invited the Pharisees and the unbelieving Jews to enter His Church, and therein to partake of the gospel feast, and share in the joy of the faithful. But they refused the invitation from hatred of Christ crucified, and because they were offended that the Gentiles should believe on Him, and they will remain obstinate in their refusal until the coming of Elias at the end of the world. So S. Augustine bids us "admire God's goodness towards His people;" and S. Jerome, "How kind and how merciful a father! He asks his son to share in the joy of the household."*H And he answering, said to his father: Behold, for so many years do I serve thee and I have never transgressed thy commandment: and yet thou hast never given me a kid to make merry with my friends.
Ver. 29. I have never transgressed, &c. With what face could the Jews, represented here by the eldest son, say they have never transgressed the commandments of their father? This made Tertullian think that this was not the expression of the Jews, but of the faithful Christians; and, therefore, he interprets the whole parable as applied to a disciple of Christ. But we should recollect, that it is not uncommon for presumption to boast of what it never has done. The whole history of the Jews is full of numberless details of their prevarication and disobedience. Calmet. — A kid, &c. The Jews demanded a kid, but the Christians a lamb; therefore was Barabbas set at liberty for them, whilst for us the lamb was immolated. S. Amb.
*Lapide
. And he answering said, Lo, these many years do I serve thee. The Syriac has "servio tibi servitutem," so the Jews were in bondage to the observance of the law. Neither transgressed I at any time thy commandment. This answer shows the lying arrogance and the ingratitude of the Jews, who boasted of their work done under the law, and forgot the many benefits which God had conferred upon them. They lie when they say they have never transgressed the commandment of God. They transgress often! For, says St. Jerome (Ep. 146), "Is it not a transgression to envy our brother his salvation?" With like arrogancy, the Pharisee justifies himself, and despises the Publican. St. Luke xviii. II. But as St. Augustine and the Interlinear point out, the Jews did not bow down to idols, as the Gentiles did, and therefore, inasmuch as they worshipped the one true God, and Him alone, in this particular they did not transgress the commandment. And yet thou never gavest me a kid. The fathers explain this symbolically in many ways. "No blood of prophet or priest has delivered us from the Roman yoke, but for the prodigal, i.e ., for the Gentiles, for sinners, throughout the whole world, Thy precious blood was shed." St. Jerome (Ep. 146), "Thou hast never, for my sake, ordered a kid, i.e. a sinner who persecuted me, to be slain." Theophylact. "Thou, O Christ, hast never given me Thyself for my food, because I accounted Thee as a kid, i.e., as a sinner, and a perverter of the Law." St. Augustine. "The Jews demand a kid: the Christians a lamb. For them Barabbas is set free; for us the lamb is slain." St. Ambrose.* Summa
*S Part 4, Ques 89, Article 3
[III, Q. 89, Art. 3]
Whether, by Penance, Man Is Restored to His Former Dignity?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not restored by Penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos 5:2, "The virgin of Israel is cast down," observes: "It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed." Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.
Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says: "Whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree." Again, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. vi ad Agapit.) that "the canons framed at the council of Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of clerics." Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.
Obj. 3: Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written (Ezech. 44:10, 13): "The Levites that went away . . . from Me . . . shall never [Vulg.: 'not'] come near to Me, to do the office of priest": and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52), and taken from the council of Lerida: "If those who serve at the Holy Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by God's mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so as not to receive further promotion." Therefore Penance does not restore man to his former dignity.
_On the contrary,_ As we read in the same Distinction, Gregory writing to Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: "We consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position": and moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: "Contumacious clerics, so far as their position allows, should be corrected by their bishops, so that when Penance has reformed them, they may recover their degree and dignity."
_I answer that,_ By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. One is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance, which is signified (Luke 15) in the prodigal son, for when he repented, his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity, viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son boasted saying (Luke 15:29): "Behold, for so many years do I serve thee, and I have never transgressed thy commandments": and this dignity the penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless he recovers something greater sometimes; because as Gregory says (Hom. de centum Ovibus, 34 in Evang.), "those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from God, make up for their past losses, by subsequent gains: so that there is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned his back, but has done nothing brave."
By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the ecclesiastical dignity. This he is debarred from recovering: first, because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop Masso, and as we read in the Distinction quoted above (Obj. 3): "The canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order, nor received to the grace of communion."
Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written in the same Distinction (Obj. 3): "We can be sure that those who show no signs of humble compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or study, would exercise their former duties with great negligence if they were restored to them."
Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is attached; wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (Obj. 3), quoting the council of Pope Martin [*Martin, bishop of Braga]: "If a man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to the ranks of the clergy: and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he must be turned out. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in self-defense." But this is in consequence not of sin, but of irregularity.
Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (Obj. 3): "Those who have been publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes, according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to God's people that such persons should be placed over them. But those who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds." The same is expressed (Extra, De Qual. Ordinand.): "If the aforesaid crimes are not proved by a judicial process, or in some other way made notorious, those who are guilty of them must not be hindered, after they have done penance, from exercising the orders they have received, or from receiving further orders, except in cases of homicide."
Reply Obj. 1: The same is to be said of the recovery of virginity as of the recovery of innocence which belongs to man's secondary dignity in the sight of God.
Reply Obj. 2: In these words Jerome does not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult, for man to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to none but those who repent perfectly, as stated above. To those canonical statutes, which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): "If the law of the Church forbids anyone, after doing penance for a crime, to become a cleric, or to return to his clerical duties, or to retain them the intention was not to deprive him of the hope of pardon, but to preserve the rigor of discipline; else we should have to deny the keys given to the Church, of which it was said: 'Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.'" And further on he adds: "For holy David did penance for his deadly crimes, and yet he retained his dignity; and Blessed Peter by shedding most bitter tears did indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet he remained an apostle. Nevertheless we must not deem the care of later teachers excessive, who without endangering a man's salvation, exacted more from his humility, having, in my opinion, found by experience, that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honors and power."
Reply Obj. 3: This statute is to be understood as applying to those who do public penance, for these cannot be promoted to a higher order. For Peter, after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ's sheep, as appears from John 21:21, where Chrysostom comments as follows: "After his denial and repentance Peter gives proof of greater confidence in Christ: for whereas, at the supper, he durst not ask Him, but deputed John to ask in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the head of his brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for him, what concerned him, but henceforth asks the Master instead of John." _______________________
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