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*H If any man make a vow to the Lord, or bind himself by an oath: he shall not make his word void but shall fulfil all that he promised.
Ver. 3. Oath, to do something commendable, shall observe his promise, whether any body has heard him or not. The Rabbins pretend, that if the vow be not expressed in words, it is not obligatory. But this is only true before men, who cannot subject their fellow creatures to punishment for internal faults. H. — The obligation of a vow or oath is founded upon common honesty, which requires that we should comply with our lawful promises; and, though all properly belong to God, yet, as he does not strictly require us to do every good work, which may be in our power, we may, by vow, testify our desire to please and honour him the more. Some of the Rabbins have very loose sentiments with respect to vows, which they look upon as no better than building an altar, or immolating a victim upon the high places. It is sufficient, they say, to observe the law, apud Fagium. C. — Luther was desirous of introducing the same loose morality among Christians. But we need not ask, what the Rabbins said, or Luther, &c. But what does God and his Church assert? The Scripture repeatedly commends prudent vows; and those who can persuade themselves, that they can infringe such solemn promises without offence, will be little solicitous about keeping their word to a fellow creature, unless when interest, or fear of shame, force them to do it. H. — He who makes a vow to abstain from any thing lawful, would be guilty of sin if he should observe it afterwards. S. Aug. q. 56. W.
*H If a woman vow any thing, and bind herself by an oath, being in her father's house, and but yet a girl in age: if her father knew the vow that she hath promised, and the oath wherewith she hath bound her soul, and held his peace, she shall be bound by the vow:
Ver. 4. Girl in age, not 12; or, if more, at least not married, nor out of her father's house, v. 17. For either of these conditions rendered a girl incapable of binding herself irrevocably. The father, or all who had the care of her, might rescind her vow, provided they did it as soon as it came to their knowledge, or on the same day, v. 15. Boys under 13, were under similar restrictions. Grotius. — Wives, and, in general, all who are under subjection, could not dispose of themselves without the consent of their superiors, as their want of prudence, &c. might have otherwise injured what belonged, in some measure, to another. H. — The law, therefore, submits their case to the decision of their immediate judges. C. — But if the thing, which a person vowed, was already of strict obligation, as to fast on the day of expiation, (Lev. xxiii. 29,) no one could presume to hinder his wife from complying with this double duty. W.
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 88, Article 8
[II-II, Q. 88, Art. 8]
Whether Those Who Are Subject to Another's Power Are Hindered from Taking Vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows.
Obj. 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to another's power.
Obj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
Obj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot bind themselves by vow.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Reply Obj. 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.
A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master's service.
Reply Obj. 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
Reply Obj. 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it. _______________________
NINTH
*S Part 3, Ques 189, Article 5
[II-II, Q. 189, Art. 5]
Whether Children Should Be Received in Religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Nullus): "No one should be tonsured unless he be of legal age and willing." But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in religion.
Obj. 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1] from _religare_ (to bind) or from _re-eligere_ (to choose again), as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they should not enter religion.
Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath (Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.
Obj. 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their parents or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can. Puella) that "if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they choose, can at once declare the deed null and void." It is therefore unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or bound to religion.
_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 19:14): "Suffer the little children, and forbid them not to come to Me." Expounding these words Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that "the disciples of Jesus before they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf. Matt. 19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: but our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. We must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in wisdom we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1), the religious vow is twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such a vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called "the age of puberty," although in some it comes earlier and in others it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; for instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his master: for his master can annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And since boys and girls under the age of puberty are naturally in their father's power as regards the disposal of their manner of life, their father may either cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).
Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching the age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father's authority, under whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the law whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in the majority of cases. If, however, the child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents; though if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in the sight of God.
The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious. Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of the solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what happens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of puberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the use of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to make him a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc. cap. Significatum est.).
Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the Baptist (Luke 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was in the deserts." Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), "the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Benedict to be nurtured for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting, according to Lam. 3:27, "It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth." It is for this reason that by common custom children are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass their lives.
Reply Obj. 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be educated in a religious house.
Reply Obj. 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the atta[in]ment of perfection, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4); and accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it. But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4).
Reply Obj. 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.
Reply Obj. 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent: but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her parents' authority. _______________________
SIXTH
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 89, Article 9
[II-II, Q. 89, Art. 9]
Whether Anyone Can Dispense from an Oath?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has promised by oath to do in the future.
Obj. 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone.
Obj. 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation.
_On the contrary,_ A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above (A. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 10), the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation.
Reply Obj. 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows (Q. 88, A. 10, ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of oaths.
Reply Obj. 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided he give his consent" or some such like condition.
Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num. 30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (Q. 88, AA. 8, 9). _______________________
TENTH
*H If she have a husband, and shall vow any thing, and the word once going out of her mouth shall bind her soul by an oath,
Ver. 7. Husband, whether she live with him, or with her father; whether she be only espoused, or the marriage be consummated. Women often staid for some time at their father's house after they were married; and, in this case, some people say that either her father or her husband might disannul her vow. But others allow this right only to her husband. Bonfrere. See v. 11. C.
* Summa
*S Part 3, Ques 88, Article 8
[II-II, Q. 88, Art. 8]
Whether Those Who Are Subject to Another's Power Are Hindered from Taking Vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows.
Obj. 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to another's power.
Obj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
Obj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot bind themselves by vow.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Reply Obj. 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.
A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master's service.
Reply Obj. 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
Reply Obj. 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it. _______________________
NINTH
*H If she vow and bind herself by oath, to afflict her soul by fasting, or abstinence from other things, it shall depend on the will of her husband, whether she shall do it, or not do it.
Ver. 14. It. The Rabbins restrain this law to fasting and abstinence. But the Heb. seems more general, (v. 13,) "every vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may ratify or annul." The vows of abstinence are most common, and generally more disagreeable to husbands. C. — S. Augustine (q. 59,) thinks it unreasonable that the husband should have a control over the vows of continency in his wife, any more than she could have over him, in this particular, as their rights are equal: he seems inclined to allow him to annul the vows of abstinence only. Indeed this seems to be the meaning of afflicting the soul, which is done by submitting to various restraints, required on days of fasting. See Lev. xxiii. 27. H. — In things which could nowise hurt the parent or husband, many believe, that the person who had made a vow, was bound to perform it secretly, even though the superior had declared his dissent. But with respect to fasting, pilgrimages, &c. which could not be performed, without his knowledge, it does not seem that they were under any farther obligation, even though the superior should retract what he had connived at for a whole day. In doubtful cases, inferiors must not refuse to obey. The sin lies at the door of him who exercises his authority in an improper manner. Lyran. T. v. 16.
*H But if the husband hearing it hold his peace, and defer the declaring his mind till another day: whatsoever she had vowed and promised, she shall fulfil: because immediately as he heard it, he held his peace.
Ver. 15. Day. Heb. "from day to day." If he has not given his decision on the first day when the vow came to his knowledge, unless he asked for a delay, as some allow, the person was bound to perform what she had promised. C. — Immediately. Heb. "in the day," which seems to restrict the power of annulling the vow to a single day, v. 4. It would be unreasonable for the person to be kept long in suspense; and the law of God requires that we should not defer to perform our vows. Eccles. v. 3. 4. H.
*H But if he gainsay it after that he knew it, he shall bear her iniquity.
Ver. 16. That. Sept. "the day." If he retract his consent, he shall incur all the guilt. S. Aug. q. 59. The woman need not be under any disquietude, as the fault is not in her. C. — If a person had made a rash vow, he might obtain a dispensation from the tribunal of three judges, or from a doctor of the law, who would enjoin him to offer the sacrifice for ignorance, to punish his levity. See Seld. Jur. vii. 2. Those who break their vow are to be scourged among the Jews, which shews that they do not, in general, approve the sentiments of those Rabbins whom Fagius, a Protestant, alleges, v. 3. They make a distinction between vows and promises confirmed by an oath, v. 11. The former change the nature of a thing, according to them; so that, if a person should vow not to wear the phylacteries ordained by Moses, he must comply, though not if he had only promised on oath to refrain. But this distinction is absurd. No vow or oath can bind any person to transgress the law of God. H.