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*H And God remembered Noe, and all the living creatures, and all the cattle which were with him in the ark, and brought a wind upon the earth, and the waters were abated:
Ver. 1. Remembered; not as if God had ever forgotten Noe, but he now shews his remembrance of him by the effects. M. — A wind, lit. a spirit, which S. Amb. and Theodoret understood of the Holy Ghost, that as he moved over the waters at first, (C. 1. 2.) to give them fecundity, and to exercise his power in establishing order, so he may shew the same care and providence for this new world, emerging, like the former, from the waters. H. — Most interpreters, however, understand this of a violent wind; (Prov. xxv. 23. Exod. xiv. 21.) a strong blast, such as was sent to divide the Red sea. M.
*H And the waters returned from off the earth going and coming: and they began to be abated after a hundred and fifty days.
Ver. 3. And the waters returned, &c. S. Jerom on this passage remarks, "that all waters and torrents repair to the womb of the abyss, through the hidden veins of the earth," and by the abyss understands the sea: according to that of Ecclesiastes, 1. 7, all the rivers run into the sea. But as the sea itself, on this occasion, exceeded its limits, (otherwise its waters would not have been higher than the land) the sense perhaps confined to this, that the waters by degrees were diminished; as we may say of the inundations of land, that the waters are gone off, not by the regular course of ditches, but from the effects of the sun and winds which dry them up. E.
*H And the ark rested in the seventh month, the seven and twentieth day of the month, upon the mountains of Armenia.
Ver. 4. And the ark rested on the mountains of Armenia. The Hebrew word is Ararat, which also occurs in the 37th chap. of Isaias, and the 51st of Jeremias; for in these places our interpreter retained the Hebrew word, but in the 4th book of Kings, xix. 37, where the same history is related, it is translated by the land of the Armenians. E. — Seventh month, of the year, not of the deluge, as appears from v. 13, &c. M. — Seven and twentieth. So also the Sept., but the Heb. &c. have the 17th. It is not easy to decide which is right. On the seventeenth the waters only began to decrease, and some hence argue for the Vulgate, as they say it is not probable the ark would stop that very day. C. — This, however, might be the only mean by which Noe could discern that the waters were abating. H. — The ark being about fourteen cubits sunk in the water, might soon touch the summit of the highest mountains, such as M. Taurus, of which the Ararat, here mentioned in the Hebrew, a mountain of Armenia, forms a part, according to S. Jerom. The Armenians still boast that they have the remains of the ark. Berosus, the Pagan historian, says bitumen was taken from it as a preservative. Jos. Ant. 1. 3. Eus. præp. ix. 4. The Chaldee has Cordu for Ararat, whence some have supposed, that the ark rested on the Cordyean or Gordiean mountains. The Armenians call the mountain near Erivan, Mesesonsar, or the mountain of the ark. C.
*H Which went forth and did not return, till the waters were dried up upon the earth.
Ver. 7. Did not return. The negotiation Not, is not to be found in any Hebrew copy now extant; though it is still retained by the Septuagint, and several Latin manuscripts, according to the testimony of Liranus. If we adhere, therefore, to the Hebrew text, we must translate it with S. Jerom, thus; It went forth, going and returning, (Egredicbatur exiens et revertens) sometimes repairing to the mountains, where it found carcasses to feed on, and at other times returning not unto the ark, but to rest upon the top of it. E. Ch. — Or receded farther from it; as the Hebrew may be explained, agreeably to the Vulgate, Sept. Syr. &c. which admit the negation. C. — Till, as long as the waters covered the earth, not that it returned to the ark afterwards. M.
*H But she not finding where her foot might rest, returned to him into the ark: for the waters were upon the whole earth: and he put forth his hand, and caught her, and brought her into the ark.
Ver. 9. Whole earth, excepting the mountains; so that the dove presently returned. H.
*H And she came to him in the evening carrying a bough of an olive tree, with green leaves, in her mouth. Noe therefore understood that the waters were ceased upon the earth.
Ver. 11. Green leaves. The olive tree preserves its verdure and grows even at the bottom of the Red sea, and other seas in the East. Plin. xii. 25. — Many other trees and seeds will live for a long time under the waters. C. — This tender branch of the olive seems to agree better with the spring than autumn; whence Tirin infers, that the deluge began and ended in spring.
*H Therefore in the six hundredth and first year, the first month, the first day of the month, the waters were lessened upon the earth, and Noe opening the covering of the ark, looked, and saw that the face of the earth was dried.
Ver. 13. Year of Noe's age, who, we may suppose, was born on the first day of the year. So that his 601st year corresponds with the 1657th of the world, B.C. 2343, on which day the deluge ended. Still Noe waited for God's order to leave the ark till the 27th of the ensuing month, when the earth was more perfectly dried. H. — Covering. Some think that the window was at the top, like a sky-light. C.
*H All living things that are with thee of all flesh, as well in fowls as in beasts, and all creeping things that creep upon the earth, bring out with thee, and go ye upon the earth: increase and multiply upon it.
Ver. 17. Increase. Heb. "let them increase." This is spoken of the brute creation, the blessing is given to men. C. ix. — Neither Noe's family, nor any of the animals, had any young in the ark. C.
*H And Noe built an altar unto the Lord: and taking of all cattle and fowls that were clean, offered holocausts upon the altar.
Ver. 20. Holocausts, or whole burnt offerings. In which the whole victim was consumed by fire upon God's altar, and no part was reserved for the use of priest or people. Ch. — This is the first time we read of an altar, though Abel had surely made use of one. M. — Noe delays not to shew his gratitude to God. S. Amb. W.
* Footnotes
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Matthew
15:19
For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies.
*H And the Lord smelled a sweet savour, and said: I will no more curse the earth for the sake of man: for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth: therefore I will no more destroy every living soul as I have done.
Ver. 21. Smelled, &c. A figurative expression, denoting that God was pleased with the sacrifices which his servant offered, (Ch.) and in this sense it is expressed in the Chaldee, "God received his offering gratefully." God requires sacrifices of us, to testify his dominion, and not for any advantage he derives from them; but rather to bless us, if we perform our duty with fervour. — For the sake of, or on account of men's sins. They are so prone to evil, that, if I were to punish them as often as they deserve, new deluges might be sent every day. I take pity on their weakness. I will punish the most criminal, but not as I have done, by cursing the earth. These words of God, are by some addressed to Noe, by others to God the Son. Heb. "he said to his heart;" Onkelos, "he said in his word;" Sept. "he said with reflection." C. — Noe was beloved by God, and therefore may be called his heart. To speak to the heart, often means to comfort. H.
* Summa
*S Part 2, Ques 85, Article 3
[I-II, Q. 85, Art. 3]
Whether Weakness, Ignorance, Malice and Concupiscence Are Suitably Reckoned As the Wounds of Nature Consequent Upon Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 76, A. 1; Q. 77, AA. 3, 5; Q. 78, A. 1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin.
Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature.
Obj. 4: Further, it has been stated (Q. 77, A. 3) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.
Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
_On the contrary,_ The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].
_I answer that,_ As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (Q. 81, A. 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.
Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (AA. 1, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.
Reply Obj. 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sin again.
Reply Obj. 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gen. 8:21: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth.'].
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 82, A. 3, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.
Reply Obj. 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.
Reply Obj. 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence. ________________________
FOURTH
*S Part 3, Ques 60, Article 4
[II-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]
Whether Doubts Should Be Interpreted for the Best?
Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gen. 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.
Obj. 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the worst.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.
Reply Obj. 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
Reply Obj. 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves.
Reply Obj. 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above. _______________________
FIFTH
*H All the days of the earth, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day, shall not cease.
Ver. 22. Seed-time, according to the Targum of Jonathan, is the equinox of September; harvest, that of March; winter and summer denote the solstice of December and of June. But the Hebrews probably divided the year into summer and winter; or perhaps they might also admit the season of spring, with the Egyptians and the ancient Greeks, who represented the seasons by the three hours, daughters of Jupiter. C.