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*H A prayer of Moses the man of God. Lord, thou hast been our refuge from generation to generation.
Ver. 1. God. This characterizes the Jewish legislator. Bert. Deut. xxxiii. 1. D. — David composed it in his name, (M.) or it bears some analogy with his writings. S. Jerom maintains, that he was the author of the nine following psalms, (C.) which have no title in Heb. T. — But S. Aug. thinks they would then have formed a part of the pentateuch. C. — The life of man was longer in the days of Moses than seventy or eighty years. Bell. v. 10. — Moses cannot be the author of the 94th and 95th psalms. W. — In the xcviii. 6. Samuel is mentioned, and it is not necessary to have recourse to the prophetic spirit. One of the descendants of Moses, during the captivity, may have been the author, (C.) or David may have predicted that event. H.
* Summa
*S Part 1, Ques 13, Article 7
[I, Q. 13, Art. 7]
Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of God Temporally?
Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.
Obj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.
Obj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.
Obj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.
Obj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Obj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
_I answer that,_ The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between _being_ and _non-being_ formed by reason, apprehending _non-being_ as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.
Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
Reply Obj. 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.
Reply Obj. 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).
Reply Obj. 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
Reply Obj. 4: Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.
Reply Obj. 5: Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
Reply Obj. 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary [to consider the order] of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself. _______________________
EIGHTH
*S Part 4, Ques 16, Article 6
[III, Q. 16, Art. 6]
Whether This Is True: "God Was Made Man"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God was made man." For since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply. But this is false: "God was made simply." Therefore this is false: "God was made man."
Obj. 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and I change not." Hence this is false: "God was made man."
Obj. 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person of the Son of God. But this is false: "God was made the Person of the Son of God." Therefore this is false: "God was made man."
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:14): "The Word was made flesh": and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), "when he said, 'The Word was made flesh,' it is as if it were said that God was made man."
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above (A. 1), yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature. Hence, this is true, "God was made man"; though it is understood differently by some: even as this, "God is man," as we said above (A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But God is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And hence for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, to be made implies that something is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God: "Lord, Thou art made [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, "God was made man," we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature.
Reply Obj. 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God, but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, "God was made the Person of the Son of God," yet this is true: "God was made man" by being united to human nature. _______________________
SEVENTH
*H Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed; from eternity and to eternity thou art God.
Ver. 2. Formed. Heb. "brought forth." Job xxxviii. 8. C. — Here Origen improperly concluded the sentence. S. Jer. Ep. ad Cypr. — God, is not in Sept. Syr. or ancient Latin psalters. C. — Al signifies both God, and not, and seems to be twice explained in the Vulg. as Heb. omits not, v. 3. H. — The sentence would be very striking, if God were left out, as it is done by Houbigant. The eternity of matter is refuted by this text. Bert. W. — God's eternity is contrasted with man's short life. C. — New gods must of course be false. M. — Plato asserted, that "the creator of all must be unbegotten and eternal." Plut. Conviv. viii.
*H Turn not man away to be brought low: and thou hast said: Be converted, O ye sons of men.
Ver. 3. Turn not man away, &c. Suffer him not quite to perish from thee, since thou art pleased to call upon him to be converted to thee. Ch. — God wills not the death of the sinner. W. — Give him grace not to yield to his base passions. S. Aug. — Heb. "thou humblest man," (H.) that he may enter into himself. C.
*H For a thousand years in thy sight are as yesterday, which is past. And as a watch in the night,
Ver. 4. For, &. This thought naturally tends to convert the sinner. — Watch. Consisting of three hours, (Bert.) which were of unequal length, according to the seasons. C. — A thousand years seem not so long to God. H. — What then must be the short life of man? See Job vii. 8. C. — None ever lived one thousand years. Yet what would that be, compared with eternity? W.
*H Things that are counted nothing, shall their years be.
Ver. 5. Their years be. Heb. "thou strikest, (C.) or inundatest them: they are a dream." But our version is accurate. Bert.
*H In the morning man shall grow up like grass; in the morning he shall flourish and pass away: in the evening he shall fall, grow dry, and wither.
Ver. 6. Fall. Heb. "it is cut down and dries." The heat of the climate caused the flowers to decay very soon. Is. xl. 6. Man's youth touches on old age. C. — The present moment is all we can call our own. Bert. — "A young man may die soon: an old man cannot live long," says an English proverb. W.
*H Thou hast set our iniquities before thy eyes: our life in the light of thy countenance.
Ver. 8. Life. Lit. "age." Thou clearly discernest all our proceedings. H. — Man is condemned for Adam's sin. The Israelites who were fit for arms, and gave way to murmuring, were sentenced to die in the desert. He may allude to this event. Bert. — Heb. may signify also, "our hidden things," or "youth," (C.) or "mistakes," (Houbig.) or "negligences." S. Jer. — From these we should always pray to be delivered. Ps. xxiv. 7. H. — Sin occasions the shortness of life, (W.) as man was created to be immortal. H. — Before the deluge, men lived indeed longer. M.
*H For all our days are spent; and in thy wrath we have fainted away. Our years shall be considered as a spider:
Ver. 9. As a spider. As frail and weak as a spider's web; and miserable withal, whilst, like a spider, we spend our bowels in weaving webs to catch flies. Ch. — Meditabuntur is here used in a passive sense. T. — Heb. "we have spent our years like one speaking a word." S. Jer. — When he has done, the sound is no more: so their memory has perished with a sound. Ps. ix. 8. H. — Heb. Chal. &c. do not mention the spider: Yet it seems to have been originally in the text, as it is recognized by the Syr. Sept. and the other Greek interpreters, and makes the sense more complete. C. — The transcribers might more easily omit than the Sept. &c. could insert this word. Bert.
*H The days of our years in them are threescore and ten years. But if in the strong they be fourscore years: and what is more of them is labour and sorrow. For mildness is come upon us: and we shall be corrected.
Ver. 10. In them. Years, (C.) "in the world." Chal. "altogether." Sym. years. This was the usual term of man's life in David's time, (H.) and about the captivity, when this was written. Many lived above one hundred years when Moses wrote. C. — Yet this proves nothing, as there are still instances of equal longevity, though it is true, that people in general seldom live above seventy, or eighty, or if they do, their days are a burden to them. The same might be the case under Moses. He probably here alludes to those warriors, who were cut off in the wilderness, few of whom would survive 80. Bert. — The author of Ecclesiasticus, (xviii. 8.) gives one hundred, for the utmost limits of life. The pagan sages speak in the same style as the psalmist. C. — Strong. Sept. "in dominion." But here it means in a vigorous constitution. Bell. — Princes lived no longer than others. Heb. and Vulg. may be "the prime, or most of them," as even a great part of the time before seventy, as well as after, (H.) is usually spent in misery. Gen. xlvii. 9. C. — Mildness. God's mildness corrects us: in as much as he deals kindly with us, in shortening the days of this miserable life; and so weaning our affections from all its transitory enjoyments, and teaching us true wisdom. Ch. — Heb. "we pass quickly and fly away, (S. Jer.) like birds of passage, (C.) or "it is cut down soon," (Mont.) "in silence," (Drusius) tacitisque senescimus annis. H. — S. Jerom wonders, that the Sept. should have translated as they have done: But they are followed by Theodotion, and the Sext. edit. who may have had different copies, equally good. Bert. — Corrected (corripiemur) or "hurried away," Geneb. — But this is not the sense of the Sept. Amama. — "We grow tired." Houbig. — It is a mercy of God to shorten men's lives, (M.) as many would sin more, if they had a probability of continuing upon earth. W.
*H Who knoweth the power of thy anger, and for thy fear
Ver. 11. Anger? God must punish actual sin severely, since he thus condemns mankind on account of original sin. W.
*H Can number thy wrath? So make thy right hand known: and men learned in heart, in wisdom.
Ver. 12. Thy right hand. Your Messias, to liberate and instruct us. S. Aug. — "Make us know how to number our days thus, and we shall come to thee with a wise heart." S. Jer. Eccli. vii. 40. H. — Sept. have read iminoc for yamenu, "our days." Amama. — Make us truly wise, (Sa.) or acquainted with teachers of truth. Bellar. M.
*H We are filled in the morning with thy mercy: and we have rejoiced, and are delighted all our days.
Ver. 14. We are. Heb. "Fill us." Mont. — But the psalmist feels interiorly, that his petition has been granted. Bert. — The prospect of a glorious immortality fills us with hope in proportion to our sufferings for the truth. W.
*H And let the brightness of the Lord our God be upon us: and direct thou the works of our hands over us; yea, the work of our hands do thou direct.
Ver. 17. Yea, the work. Each in particular. Sept. Rom. &c. omit this sentence, which Houbigant improperly deems useless. Bert. — Charity must direct all. S. Aug. W.